Mental Action and Epistemology
Mental Means (under contract with Oxford University Press)
This book is about complex mental action. When you do one type of thing intentionally in thought—say, J—by intentionally doing another type of thing in thought—say, K-ing—then you J by K-ing, and in so doing perform a complex (as opposed to basic) mental action. Understanding complex mental action can help us understand how one and the same mental event can have several contents under several (true) descriptions. By seeing judgment and inference as forms of complex mental action, we can see how the intrinsically evaluative structure of intentional action grounds the application of norms to thought—including, most importantly, epistemic norms. By seeing other forms of thought as complex mental action too, we can understand how executive control is more unified than some cognitive scientists say it is.
How to Judge Intentionally (invited at Philosophical Perspectives)
Mental Action (Philosophy Compass)
How to Think Several Thoughts at Once: Content Plurality in Mental Action (Mental Action and the Conscious Mind, ed. Michael Brent and Lisa Miracchi, forthcoming)
Embedded Mental Action in Self-Attribution of Belief (Philosophical Studies)
You can self-attribute a belief that p 'transparently' partly by judging that p. I argue that, in the relevant embedded context, an event of judging that p is also an event of self-attributing a belief that p. Seeing the numerical identity of these mental actions in this context solves an epistemological puzzle about 'transparent' self-knowledge of belief.
Aesthetics and Literature
The Problem of Creative Intention (Art & Philosophy, ed. King)
Realism, Particularism, and Grounding in Aesthetics (Normative Realism, ed. Boghossian and Peacocke)
Aesthetic Experience (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
What Makes Value Aesthetic? (Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism)
Phenomenal Experience and the Aesthetics of Agency (Journal of the Philosophy of Sport)
Let's Be Liberal: An Alternative to Aesthetic Hedonism (British Journal of Aesthetics, 2020)
Aesthetic hedonism meets four basic adequacy conditions on a theory of aesthetic value, but it is not the only view that can do so. In this paper I introduce and motivate an alternative to hedonism I call “aesthetic liberalism,” which counts more responses than pleasurable ones as crucially relevant to the aesthetic value of an object.